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ARTICLE OPEN
Four years post-horsegate: an update of measures and actions
put in place following the horsemeat incident of 2013
Stephanie Brooks 1, Christopher T. Elliott1, Michelle Spence1, Christine Walsh2 and Moira Dean1
Complexities in food supply chains were highlighted by the so called ‘horsegate’ crisis in 2013, where beef meat was fraudulently
adulterated with horse meat causing widespread recalls and subsequent investigations across both retail and food service markets
in the European Union (EU). The beef supply chain is a complex supply chain, with global (EU and Non EU) sourcing strategies in
order to secure supply. However, managing these complex supply chains can be difﬁcult and consequentially can expose
vulnerabilities similar to that of horsemeat, where horsemeat was found in beef meat within EU supply chains. Six months after the
crisis broke, an independent review into the integrity and assurance of food supply networks was commissioned by the UK
government and undertaken by Professor Chris Elliott of Queen’s University, Belfast. The review recommended eight pillars of food
integrity to industry and government: consumers ﬁrst, zero tolerance, intelligence gathering, laboratory services, audit, government
support, leadership and crisis management. This article examines the extent to which these recommendations have been
implemented using personal communications from Professor Chris Elliott and relevant industry bodies. Following the review,
industry attitudes have changed substantially, testing and surveillance systems have been integrated into normal industry practice
and the government is more prepared for future incidents through the establishment of the National Food Crime Unit (NFCU).
Horsegate raised the proﬁle of food fraud and crime in supply chains and despite improvements to date, further collaboration
between industry and government is required in order to align fully with the recommendations.
npj Science of Food  (2017) 1:5 ; doi:10.1038/s41538-017-0007-z
INTRODUCTION
Several scandals/scares have shook the food industry, some
deliberate and others accidental over the last four decades. These
include, the Spanish cooking oil disaster of 1981, the Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy outbreak of 1996, the 2011 German
Escherichia coli O104:H4 outbreak in vegetation, the Irish pork
dioxin crisis of 2008, and the 2008 Melamine crisis in infant
formula in China, to name a few. More recently, the idea of food
fraud or food crime has surfaced as a deliberate and sophisticated
practice carried out by seasoned criminals on deceiving customers
and/or consumers of the true nature of the product for ﬁnancial
gain.1,2 One of the latest and most high proﬁle food crime-based
scandals was that of horsemeat, or so called ‘horsegate’ in 2013.
BACKGROUND—‘HORSEGATE’
In January 2013, following testing by the Food Safety Authority of
Ireland as part of normal proactive monitoring activities, the
horsemeat scandal broke. Horsemeat had been found in beef meat
products sold in retail and food service markets throughout the
United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland (https://www.fsai.ie/news_centre/
press_releases/horseDNA15012013.html). Testing revealed beef
products had been adulterated with horsemeat such that horse
DNA was identiﬁed in 37% of beef burgers purchased from food
retail stores including Tesco, Dunnes, Lidl and Aldi, all originating
from three meat plants in the UK and Ireland (http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150624093026/http://www.food.gov.uk/
enforcement/monitoring/horse-meat/timeline-horsemeat). In Feb-
ruary 2013, UK company Findus and retailers Aldi and Tesco
reported ﬁnding horsemeat in their lasagne, spaghetti bolognese,
burger and meatball products, all of which were produced by a
French supplier (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2015
0624093026/http://www.food.gov.uk/enforcement/monitoring/
horse-meat/timeline-horsemeat).
Following these revelations, the European Union (EU) launched
an EU wide 3-month random sampling DNA testing progra-
mme for processed meats (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/http://www.food.gov.uk/news-updates/news/2013/5560/
eu-sampling) (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/201506
24093026/http://www.food.gov.uk/enforcement/monitoring/horse-
meat/timeline-horsemeat) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
21453370) (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/processed-
beef-products-and-horse-meat). Extensive testing was conducted
throughout the then 27 EU member states with 4144 samples
labelled as beef collected (mostly from point of sale outlets, e.g.,
retailers, quick service restaurants) and tested for horsemeat. Of
those samples, 4.66% of samples were said to contain horse DNA
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-331_en.htm). A further
7951 samples collected from food business operators including
producers, processors and distributors were tested; 1.38% of
tested samples contained horse DNA (http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-13-331_en.htm). Testing revealed no traces of
horse DNA in meat imported from outside the EU.3 From these
analyses, it was clear the crisis was not conﬁned to the UK and
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Ireland but was in fact, an issue of much larger magnitude within
the EU; the scandal continued to dominate the British and Irish
media for months after4 where the consumption of horsemeat
was considered morally unacceptable. In other EU member states,
horsemeat is regarded as food and is routinely consumed.
Substitution or adulteration of meat with another meat species
which has religious or cultural connotations e.g., pork is not eaten
by Muslim and Jewish communities, could be regarded as a more
serious transgression due to the impact on religious or cultural
identity and belief systems.
After some initial confusion in the response to the horsemeat
crisis, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) took the lead at the
country level in the UK, and undertook coordinated testing
programmes with local authorities and industry throughout the
UK.5 Six months after the crisis broke, an independent review
into ‘…the integrity and assurance of food supply networks’ was
commissioned by the UK government.6 The review was carried out
by Professor Chris Elliott of Queen’s University, Belfast (and is
hereon in referred to as The Elliott Review) and highlighted many
recommendations following publication of two reports; the
interim report published in December 2013 (https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
ﬁle/264997/pb14089-elliot-review-interim-20131212.pdf) and the
ﬁnal report, published in July 2014 (https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/3507
26/elliot-review-ﬁnal-report-july2014.pdf). It was in this review the
idea of food crime was ﬁrst concretely considered as an issue in
food supply chains. The review alluded that food fraud becomes
food crime when the act of food fraud is no longer a few random
acts by so called rogues but a series of organised activities by
groups.2
In this paper, we aim to identify the measures generated
and changes instigated by industry and government in the
UK to fulﬁl the recommendations set out by the Elliott Review
to address food fraud issues highlighted by horsegate. Firstly,
an overview of the beef supply chain is provided in order to
gain an appreciation of the complexity of the beef supply
chain, and how this can create vulnerabilities in the chain which
can be exploited by food fraudsters intent on committing food
crime.
BACKGROUND–THE UK BEEF SUPPLY CHAIN
The beef supply chain is complex with import and export channels
at several stages in the chain. Figure 1 illustrates the typical steps
involved in producing and transporting beef products through the
supply chain to the ﬁnal consumer. The steps involved at
processing and importing/exporting stages, as well as the reliance
on storage facilities and the number of actions that can occur
directly or via a trader or agent illustrate the particular intricate
nature of the beef chain. In some cases, multiple traders can be
involved in sourcing and supplying meat and when there are more
steps involved greater management of the process is required. The
external markets (importing and exporting) play a vital role in the
sufﬁciency and ﬂexibility of the UK beef supply chain.
With beef production susceptible to seasonal changes, poor
weather, disease outbreaks, crop failures and therefore feed
shortages, the importance of diverse external markets for securing
supply should not be underestimated.7,8 The illustration by the
Guardian Newspaper, provides a simpliﬁed version of events for
the Irish and French companies connections to horsemeat,
(available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/graphic/2013/feb/
15/horsemeat-scandal-food-safety1) exemplifying the complex
nature of their beef supply chains and the multiple entities which
can be involved in trading meat. The complex nature and
subsequent vulnerabilities of international agri-food supply chains
has been evaluated previously in literature.9 To meet the
requirements of UK consumers, e.g., preferences for certain cuts,
sourcing outside domestic supply chains is required in order to
secure supply but within the EU single market where trading
occurs freely, it can be more challenging to monitor and manage
supply chains and consequentially, can expose vulnerabilities
resulting in problems such as the horsemeat incident in 2013. The
need for companies to ensure supply at a low cost is thought to
be a causative factor in the horsemeat scandal. The European
Commission stated, ‘The story that horsemeat was being passed
off as beef, exposed the complex nature of our globalised food
supply chain…It demonstrated that fraudsters were taking
advantages of weaknesses in the system to the detriment of
both legitimate business and consumers.’ (http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-14-113_en.htm). However, it is important to
note that additional controls are placed on meat imports from
outside the EU and as such, at the time, horsemeat was not
detected in third country consignments. The Elliott Review6
afﬁrms the consequences of such complex systems stating, ‘The
more complex the supply chains the greater degree of
vulnerabilities…’ illustrating the difﬁculties in managing such
systems. This paradox between ensuring supply but also integrity
exempliﬁes the importance of ensuring that the stakeholders are
aware of the complexity of their food supply chains and
acknowledge, assess and mitigate against risks involved with
these chains.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Elliott Review found that while the UK food industry has made
overwhelming progress in ensuring that our food is safe to eat, the
focus has not been on preventing and protecting against food
crime.4 As a result, intelligence gathering, horizon scanning and
regimented testing were not key elements in the food industry’s
risk assessments in the prevention and detection of food crime.6
The ﬁnal report recommended eight pillars of food integrity:
consumers ﬁrst, zero tolerance, intelligence gathering, laboratory
services, audit, government support, leadership and crisis
management, and were aimed at numerous stakeholders includ-
ing, the food industry themselves (i.e., producers, processors),
regulators and enforcement bodies (government).2 The progress
made by industry and government in the last 4 years with regard
to each of the eight pillar recommendations is detailed below.
Pillar one—consumer ﬁrst
In the weeks following the horsemeat incident, consumer trust in
beef products decreased to an all-time low (http://www.tifsip.org/
european_commission_announces_actions_achieved_following_
horsemeat_scandal.html?RequestId=419cdf1b). Many media and
research institutions including 'Which?' (http://www.which.co.
uk/news/2013/03/horsemeat-scandal-dents-trust-in-food-industry-
313016/), 'The Consumer Council'10 and 'Kantar Worldpanel'
(http://uk.kantar.com/consumer/shoppers/horsemeat-scandal-
consumer-behaviour-and-trust/) reported decreases in UK con-
sumer trust in processed meat products and in food retail outlets
themselves. Kantar Worldpanel reported a 43% and 13% drop in
frozen burger and frozen-ready meals sales, respectively, in the
4 weeks leading up to 17th February 2013 compared to the same
period in 2012 (http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/News/
Grocery-Market-Share-UK-First-Data-Since-Horsemeat-Scandal).
Consumers shopping habits changed as a result of horsegate11
with a consumer survey revealing 7% of consumers stopped
purchasing meat altogether (http://www.economist.com/news/
britain/21572230-what-horse-shy-consumers-are-eating-instead-
and-winner) and 65% of consumers trusted food labels less
as a result of the incident (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
horsemeat-britain-survey-idUSBRE91H0GP20130218). A study into
consumer conﬁdence post horsegate, found that consumers
expressed a sense of betrayal and concern over the complexity
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of supply chains.4 A Consumer Council report published in July
2013 reported that almost half of (47%) consumers saw food
retailers in a less favourable light in the months following the
incident10 and a 24% decrease overall in consumer trust in the
food industry was reported in March 2013 (http://www.which.co.
uk/news/2013/03/horsemeat-scandal-dents-trust-in-food-industry-
313016/).
The Elliott Review2 recommended consumer needs be of the
highest priority for industry in order to ensure consumer
conﬁdence in the food they purchase. It was recommended that
Fig. 1 The UK Beef Supply Chain
The horsemeat incident of 2013
S Brooks et al.
3
Published in partnership with Beijing Technology and Business University npj Science of Food (2017)  5 
committing food crime should be made as difﬁcult as possible
through the prevention of contamination, adulteration and false
claims. Which? had consumers interests at the forefront when they
began their campaign entitled ‘Stop Food Fraud’ calling on
government, the FSA and local authorities to help stop food fraud
(http://www.which.co.uk/campaigns/meat-takeaways-horsemeat/).
This campaign received 37,000 consumer signatures and is
regarded as one of the integral initiatives that helped rebuild
consumer trust in the food industry following horsegate.12
Since horsegate, Professor Elliott12 believes food retailers’
attitudes have changed drastically, with transparency now a key
trend. For example, Tesco provide information online on their
meat product testing regime and is widely regarded as a
mechanism for trust building among consumers (http://www.
thegrocer.co.uk/buying-and-supplying/consumers-trust-meat-in-
supermarkets-more-than-restaurants-claims-survey/517134.article)
(https://www.tescoplc.com/tesco-and-society/further-information-
and-disclosure/testing-regime-update/). Following the campaigns
and initiatives put in place by the industry, an improvement in
consumer trust levels in the meat industry and supermarkets
was reported with consumers trust levels returning close to pre
horsegate levels (http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/buying-and-supply-
ing/consumers-trust-meat-in-supermarkets-more-than-restauran-
ts-claims-survey/517134.article).13 It is believed these campaigns
and initiatives taken to put consumers ﬁrst are claimed to have
helped the industry regain consumer trust (http://www.ibtimes.co.
uk/man-centre-2013-horse-meat-scandal-arrested-masterminding-
new-large-scale-operation-1616003).12
Pillar two—zero tolerance
The Elliott Review2 recommended the food industry adopt a zero
tolerance to food fraud and industry were encouraged to question
whether some procurement deals were ‘too good to be true’, i.e.,
procurement of raw material that is suspiciously inexpensive in
relation to anticipated cost of production, to ensure due diligence
in procuring safe and genuine food from reputable sources.
Further, food crime/fraud and mitigation strategies were to be
considered as part of risk assessment procedures and whistle-
blowing/reporting of food fraud and crime was strongly
encouraged. A whistleblowing hotline has been subsequently
set up by the National Food Crime Unit (NFCU), (see pillar 7).
Additionally, it was suggested that industry should be rewarded
for responsible procurement and sourcing practices and the
review encouraged industry to carry out sampling and testing
within their supply chains.2
Previously within the meat industry, ‘a little bit of cheating’
would have been considered acceptable within the moral
boundaries of ‘normal practice’.12 For example, horsegate can be
seen as a consequence of this ‘little bit of cheating’ where Polish
beef was procured, packaged and labelled as British beef. While
the food company believed they were operating inside the moral
boundaries of ‘normal practice’, the consequences of these
practices came when horsemeat was found within meat procured
from Poland and sold as British beef. It is a belief that the
industries are now more aware that they are being monitored
extensively by their customers through the rigorous testing
programmes implemented since horsegate and as a result
attitudes to cheating have changed.12 However, a recent online
publication suggests illegitimate actors (fraudsters) are continuing
to mastermind and facilitate food fraud (https://www.food.gov.uk/
news-updates/news/2016/15226/food-crime-conﬁdential-launch).
Despite this, it is believed there is much greater awareness of food
fraud and a realisation among legitimate meat industry actors,
such as processors, that shortcuts cannot be taken regardless of
downstream pressures.12 Genuine food businesses are aware that
any deviation from customer speciﬁcation can have great
consequences for their businesses.12 While this is thought to be
the case within the meat industry, this unfortunately may not be
the case in other sectors where shortcuts are still considered
within ‘normal practices’.12 This illustrates that there is a continued
tolerance towards food fraud by some actors and they may not
cease until abuses result in injury or death as with the Melamine
incident in 2008.
Pillar three—intelligence gathering
Government and industry focus on intelligence gathering and
sharing was the take home message from recommendation
three.2 In addition, the development of a ‘safe haven’ for industry
to collect and disclose information and intelligence (whistleblow-
ing) without fear was recommended. Protection of whistle-
blowers from retaliation has also been highlighted as a necessity
by the United States Food Safety Modernisation Act (https://www.
fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm247548.htm). Pre-
viously within the food industry technical counterparts from
different companies informally discussed suspicious supplier
behaviours or practices, but this information was never shared
with regulators and governmental departments for fear they
would be implicated in the suspicious activity.12 Top legal ﬁrms in
the UK advised their clients not to share information or
intelligence with the regulator unless absolutely necessary.12
Since horsegate, in the UK, a system has been established to
facilitate intelligence gathering and sharing within industry called
the Food Industry Intelligence Network (FIIN), which covers all
commodities and about 60% of all foods sold in the UK14 (http://
www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Food-Safety/Food-fraud-remains-a-
threat-to-UK-ﬁrms) (https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B_
9GiFJoLcpwRkhoZmFtcTNKamM). The FIIN network allows com-
panies to share anonymised information and test results via a
legal ﬁrm which ensures that competitive advantages cannot be
gained from one company knowing another’s results. The
anonymised information is passed on to the FIIN network for
analysis and subsequently shared with member companies. A lot
of company resource has been channelled into testing thousands
of meat products in light of horsegate and results indicate there to
be no detectable fraudulent activity in meat tested at the current
time12 but this does not suggest food fraud is gone for good.
Professor Elliott explains there is a distinct need for product
testing to be dynamic to ensure other commodities are examined
sufﬁciently. Despite the signiﬁcant steps the industry has taken in
sharing information and intelligence with each other, information
is still not shared with the regulator or government departments
as recommended by The Elliott Review, due to issues surrounding
conﬁdentiality, competition and fear of implication.12 Due to the
government’s commitment to a high level of transparency with
the public, food businesses have concerns regarding governments
(FSA) intentions in sharing of highly sensitive company informa-
tion such as company name. Food businesses want assurances
that personal company information will not be shared publically.12
As this written guarantee has not yet been provided, the FIIN
network information remains unshared with regulators and
government departments. Interestingly, Food Standards Scotland
(FSS) has agreed to provide this written guarantee and thus FIIN
will share their information with FSS but not the FSA at the
present time.12 The effect this may have on a potential shift in the
FSA’s position remains to be seen.
While not solely a UK initiative, The Food Fraud Network (FNN)
is another intelligence gathering initiative established post horse-
gate. The FNN set up in 2013 and comprising of 28 national food
fraud contact points in a European regulatory sharing network15,16
(http://www.foodqualitynews.com/Industry-news/EU-improves-co-
operation-between-national-authorities) (http://ec.europa.eu/
food/safety/ofﬁcial_controls/food_fraud/index_en.htm), working
closely with INTERpol and Europol on Operation Opson, targeting
organised food crime networks (http://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/
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media/OCTF/images/publications/Government%20Reports/OP-
SON-Booklet-FINAL-electronic-version.pdf?ext=.pdf). However, this
information is not shared with any other party (including industry).
Intelligence gathering and sharing was recommended and
intended to be a joint activity between regulators and industry.
However, this appears not to be the case as industry and
regulators are actively gathering and sharing information and
intelligence within their respective groups but not with each
other.
Pillar four—laboratory services
The horsemeat scandal revealed that laboratory services for food
fraud testing were not up to the required standard. The quality of
testing was unknown and the number of laboratories that could
provide such services was decreasing due to a downturn in
government spending.2 In light of this, the Elliott Review2
recommended access to resilient and sustainable laboratory
services with standardised and validated testing methods be
implemented as a priority. It urged the government to facilitate
the development of surveillance programmes (intelligence gath-
ering, horizon scanning) and targeted sampling programmes
based on intelligence gained.
Professor Elliott revealed that, in the last 4 years, there has been
a substantial increase in the number of companies now providing
meat testing services such as DNA testing, driven by the market
demand and evidenced by a simple google search (https://www.
google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie
=UTF-8#q=meat+authenticity+testing+laboratories). While this is
a positive outcome and meat products may be tested adequately,
Professor Elliott is concerned that wider food surveillance
infrastructures on other products and commodities such as herbs
and spices is lacking.
Pillar ﬁve–audit
The Elliott Review2 highlighted food audits as too food safety
focussed and food fraud awareness within auditing to be poor.
Consequently, the review recommended developing a modular
approach to auditing underpinned by both food safety and
integrity standards. The industry has taken this on board and
taken several steps to address the recommendation on a wider
industry level. The existing British Retail Consortium (BRC) Food
Safety Standard (adopted by manufactures as a pre-requisite for
customer supply) has been adapted (Issue 7) to include new
mandatory clauses concerning vulnerability assessment17 (http://
www.brcglobalstandards.com/Manufacturers/Food/FoodIssue7.
aspx#.V_txI48rK70). Food manufacturing sites are expected to
carry out frequent risk assessments of their products by
completing vulnerability assessments on raw materials procured
directly (from manufacturer) or indirectly (via agent/broker) and
establishing mitigating strategies to reduce any identiﬁable risk.17
Additionally, where raw materials are procured via an agent/
broker, sites must understand and assess the manufacturer’s
suitability as a supplier.17 It is important to note that these new
clauses apply to all food sectors and not just the meat sector.
The Elliott Review2 identiﬁed traders and brokers as an area of
vulnerability in the chain and several initiatives have been
adopted by industry to address this. The BRC Standard for Agents
and Brokers was developed to allow reputable agents and brokers
to be certiﬁed against a standard which ensures they have
processes in place to manage their supply systems, with a
particular focus on food fraud prevention.17 BRC Global Standards
state that UK food retailers are actively encouraging their agents
and brokers who supply retailer Own Label produce to become
certiﬁed against this standard.17 The BRC Standard for Agents and
Brokers was implemented on a macro industry level and
applicable to all agents and brokers (not just meat agents and
brokers) and does not take into account the speciﬁc nature of the
meat industry.18 The IMTA Good Trading Practice Guide to food
fraud prevention in 2015 is tailored speciﬁcally to meat traders
and brokers and sought to ‘identify practical steps which
companies could take to strength their resilience to fraud threats’
and is available to the International Meat Traders Association
(IMTA) members and non-members, on request.18 In addition to
the guide, IMTA have introduced a ‘meat scam tracker’ where
members can report suspect scams across the industry.18
Following active engagement with the NFCU, (see pillar 7), IMTA
members are seen to be proactively and regularly sharing
intelligence with IMTA which is subsequently passed onto the
FSA.18 Since the horsemeat scandal, IMTA have worked to ensure
better information sharing with government and acknowledge the
efforts of their members to become more food fraud aware via the
implementation of preventative measure in their businesses.18
In conjunction with the food industry and the British Meat
Processors Association, BRC Global Standards have also developed
a voluntary bolt on module to the Food Safety Standard
speciﬁcally for meat companies called Meat Supply Chain
Assurance, which goes back to the point of slaughter.17 This
modules enables the ability ‘…to demonstrate to customers an
increased transparency of their meat supply chains…’ (http://
www.brcglobalstandards.com/Manufacturers/Food/Voluntary-
Modules.aspx#.V8lG1U0rIdU), and is designed to enable meat
companies to demonstrate increased traceability and visibility in
their supply chain and how they manage species–species
contamination.18 The Meat Supply Chain Assurance bolt on is
believed to have removed some of the additional audits triggered
in the immediate aftermath of horsegate.17
The Elliott Review2 recommended regulators and industry work
together to develop an appropriate auditing training platform for
food fraud detection. While this has resulted in a market
opportunity for auditing bodies/companies, it is still in the early
stages of inception.12 Training of auditors to be forensically food
fraud aware is fraught with difﬁculties as training materials and
methods cannot enter the public domain as this would create an
awareness of the auditing scope and criteria and thus facilitating
fraudulent companies and individuals to commit further food
crime/fraud.12
The review recommended that the number of audits be
decreased through using a risk assessed approach, i.e., giving
credit where credit is due, but the quality of these audits should
be improved to ensure food fraud is an integral part.2 Contrary to
other beliefs, Professor Elliott believes the number of audits are
thought to have actually increased in light of horsegate, with
individual customers continuing to carry out their own audits.12
Auditing is a business in itself, where substantial amount of money
is generated, and could be regarded as a conﬂict of interest to
rationalising and reducing the number of audits.12 However, there
have been signiﬁcant steps taken by food retailers to move to an
unannounced platform as recommended by The Elliott Review;
99.5% of Asda audits and more than 50% of Tesco audits are now
unannounced, while M&S has created a new unannounced audit
platform speciﬁcally looking at Food Integrity.12
Pillar six—government support
Ensuring a joint and inter-disciplinary approach to ﬁghting food
fraud between high level ofﬁcials in FSA, Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and Department of
Health (DH) was recommended by The Elliott Review.2 In light of
this, the Cross-Government Group on Food Integrity and Food
Crime has been established and is chaired by the DEFRA Minister
for Food and Farming, George Eustice and attended by ministers
from the DH (Public Health), Home Ofﬁce (Organised Crime),
Business, Innovation & Skills (Consumer Affairs) and the Chair of
the FSA.19 The high level ofﬁcial group meet bi-annually with
senior ofﬁcials in these departments providing support through
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regular meetings. It is the regular collaboration and communica-
tion between senior ofﬁcials, outside of high level meetings, that
creates connectivity between departments.12
Pillar seven—leadership
The nature and magnitude of the horsegate incident was
something not previously encountered by the regulatory autho-
rities, and consequently meat fraud had been overlooked
previously.5 On the other hand, there is widespread awareness
of fraud in the olive oil and ﬁsh industries. The uniqueness of the
situation meant that in the initial days and weeks after the
incident broke, there was a lack of clarity in who was to respond
and lead the incident—the FSA or DEFRA?.5 This was reafﬁrmed in
the Elliott Review where it was identiﬁed that there was no one
body dedicated to ﬁghting and preventing food crime/fraud in
the UK and as a result, the introduction of a NFCU was
recommended.2 The Elliott Review investigated food crime
investigation infrastructures in other countries, namely the
Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany and concluded the
UK system should be modelled on a system similar to that
employed by the Dutch which has full police powers and has been
established for over 60 years.2
The NFCU, set up in December 2014 was placed within the FSA
and is headed by a former senior intelligence ofﬁcer with
experience in several law enforcement agencies including the
Serious Fraud Ofﬁce and National Crime Agency.20 The role of the
NFCU is to ‘give greater focus to enforcement against food fraud
in government by analysing intelligence, initiating investigations
and liaising with other criminal and regulatory enforcement
agencies’ and leads the response to food crime in England, Wales
and Northern Ireland.20 In June 2016, the NFCU launched Food
Crime Conﬁdential; a whistleblowing hotline where food crime
can be reported safely and anonymously (https://www.food.
gov.uk/news-updates/news/2016/15226/food-crime-conﬁdential-
launch). While signiﬁcant steps have been taken to implement the
NFCU, it is regarded as signiﬁcantly under resourced with a
£900,000 annual budget (as opposed to £2–4 million per year as
recommended by The Elliott Review), to carry out any meaningful
activities.12 The new Chair of the FSA has recently commissioned a
review of the NFCU to determine its future direction.12
Pillar eight—crisis management
The Elliott Review recommended that effective mechanisms needed
to be implemented in order to sufﬁciently deal with serious food
safety and/or food crime incidents in the future.2 The review stressed
the importance of deﬁning roles and responsibilities in the FSA
before another food safety and/or food crime incident surfaces.
While there hasn’t been another major red meat-related incident
since horsegate, there has been other major food fraud incidents
uncovered in other sectors including in the herbs and spices,21
honey (http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/ofﬁcial_controls/food_fraud/
honey/index_en.htm) and ﬁsh (http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/
ofﬁcial_contr) industries. A study carried out by the Institute for
Global Food Security at Queen’s University Belfast found 24% of
oregano samples purchased from UK retailers and online sources
had been adulterated with other non-oregano ingredients.21
Professor Elliott believes there has been a signiﬁcant learning in
dealing with major food incidents and government is now much
better equipped to deal with major food fraud incidents,
compared to when horsegate surfaced in 2013.
It is believed there is a much greater understanding among
industry and government of how food fraud incidents like
horsegate can occur in these complex supply chains. While
signiﬁcant improvements in the understanding of fraud and the
application of fraud prevention have been made in industry and
government, it is important to note that ‘fraud hasn’t gone away,
[and that] fraud [type] just changes’.12 This illustrates that the ﬁght
against food fraud/crime is a continuous process as fraudsters
continue to evolve and ﬁnd innovative ways to inﬁltrate supply
chains as long as human greed exists. It is therefore important to
ensure mitigation and detection strategies are at least equally
innovative and evolutionary.
By mapping the UK beef supply chain, this paper has provided
context as to how the nature of complex and convoluted supply
chains can create vulnerabilities open to exploitation by opportu-
nistic food fraudsters, particularly within the EU. The Elliott Review’s
eight pillars of integrity recommended measures to help improve
the integrity of food supply systems. Signiﬁcant steps have been
made by both industry and government to implement some of the
recommendations in the UK. Industry attitudes to ‘a little bit of
cheating’ have changed substantially. Testing and surveillance
systems that have been integrated into normal industry practice
and the government are more prepared for future incidents
through the establishment of the NFCU and the deﬁning of roles
and responsibilities. Horsegate substantially raised the proﬁle of
food fraud and crime occurrence within supply chains and despite
improvements to date, further collaboration between industry and
government is required in order to align fully with the recommen-
dations set out in The Elliott Review. Ensuring the sharing of
intelligence across industry and government and adequate
resource allocation are particularly important in the ﬁght against
food fraud. Lessons learnt in the UK and Ireland in relation to
horsemeat and the subsequent implemented recommendations
and initiatives from The Elliott Review are not only applicable to UK
and Irish contexts. They are also relevant to other jurisdictions to
enable the implementation of safeguards in preventing food fraud
and crime in their own country.
METHODS
Using personal communications with key representatives of relevant
industry bodies, BRC Global Standards, the IMTA and Professor Chris
Elliott), this paper aims to provide an overview of the actions and changes
put in place by industry and government in line with the recommenda-
tions set out in the Elliott Review. Ethical approval was gained from the
Research Ethics Committee at Queen’s University Belfast and the research
was completed in line with guidance under the Declaration of Helsinki.
Prior consent from interviewees was gained and interviews were carried
out between August and September 2016.
Data availability
The authors declare that the data supporting the ﬁndings of this study are
available within the paper.
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